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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
This case was instituted by plaintiff in the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-16
and 17 (1953).

The statutory provisions are set out verbatim

as required by Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals:
78-31-16. Vacating by court - Grounds.- In any of the
following cases the court shall, after notice and hearing,
make an order vacating the award, upon the application of
any party to the arbitration:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud
or other undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrations, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or
so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
Where an award is vacated, and the time within which
the agreement required the award to be made has not
expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.
78-31-17. Modification by court - Grounds. - In any of the
following cases the court shall, after notice and hearing,
make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration:
(1) Where there was an evident miscalculation of
figures, or an evident mistake in the description of any
person, thing or property, referred to in the award.
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(2) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter
not submitted to them.
(3) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form
not affecting the merits of the controversy.
The order must modify and correct the award so as to
effect the intent thereof.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issue presented for appeal is whether plaintiff, under
the facts established at the trial of this matter, had a
reasonable basis for instituting this action seeking to vacate
or modify an arbitration award and, if so, whether defendants'
Counterclaim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing fails as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

Appellants, Paul and Penny Lochhead

("Lochheads") suffered damage to their residence and personal
property in a fire on or about October 18, 1983.

Respondent,

American Concept Insurance Company ("American Concept") issued
a homeowners policy of insurance which was in force at the time
of the fire.

The parties could not agree on the amount of the

loss and, pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract,
submitted the matter for appraisal.

As a result of the

appraisal procedure, three awards were signed:
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One for damage

to the structure, one for additional living expenses incurred
by defendants after the loss and one for personal property
damage.

American Concept paid the amounts for the awards for

damage to the structure and additional living expenses, but
sought relief in the form of vacation or modification of the
award for personal property loss pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-31-16 and 78-31-17, respectively, because its appraiser
told it that the wrong figure had been included in the award.
Course of Proceedings.

Pursuant to the statutory

procedure, an evidentiary hearing was held on August 27, 1985.
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses called by
plaintiff and defendants and receiving the documentary evidence
submitted by the parties, the trial court entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The court denied the relief sought by

American Concept, ruling that it would not go behind the signed
award absent proof by plaintiff of fraud in the procurement
thereof.

(Transcript at 188) (Findings of Fact If 14)

Subsequent to American Concept's filing of its Petition to
Modify or Vacate the Arbitration Award, the Utah Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), which held that there is a bilateral duty
of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract of
insurance.

Lochheads were allowed to amend their Answer to
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state a counterclaim for alleged breach by American Concept of
this duty.
Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing on, American
Concept's Petition to Modify or Vacate the Arbitration Award,
it brought a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of
Lochheads Counterclaim on the ground that there existed a bona
fide issue regarding the propriety of the award and that it had
properly sought review of the award pursuant to Utah law.
The trial court granted American Concept's Motion for
Summary Judgment: and Lochheads have appealed.
Statements of Fact.

There is no dispute that Lochheads

suffered a loss as a result of a fire on or about October 18,
1983.

There is no dispute that American Concept had a

homeowners policy of insurance in effect at the time of the
fire.

There were three components to Lochheads* claim for

losses incurred as a result of the fire:

structural damage to

the residence, additional living expenses, and damage to
personal contents.

American Concept paid the total amount of

Lochheads' additional living expense claim and agreed to
separate appraisals of the structural loss and the personal
contents loss, as the parties could not agree on the amount of
those claims.

Subsequent to the appraisal with regard to the

structural loss, American Concept paid the amount of the
arbitration award.
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American Concept retained the services of Donald Laursen to
represent it with regard to the appraisal of the personal
property loss.

(Tr. at 4 ) .

Mr. Laursen travelled from his California residence to Salt
Lake City and began his investigation of the loss on
January 12, 1984.

(Tr. at 6 ) .

Mr. Laursen spent January 12, 13 and 14 performing a
thorough examination of the personal property which Lochheads
claimed to have been lost.

(Tr. at 8-18).

Mr. Laursen prepared a detailed, item-by-item evaluation of
the loss.

(Trial exhibits P2, 3, 4, 5; Tr. at 10-26).

The total of Mr. Laursen's figures amounted to $50,158.17,
to which he added $2,884.09 for "sales tax", for a total of
$53,042.26.

(Tr. at 27).

Mr. Laursen testified that the figure of $53,042.26 was the
actual amount of the appraisal agreed upon by the appraisers.
It was this amount, that he understood the Lochheads would
submit to American Concept as the final amount to be paid for
personal content loss.

However, he had been persuaded to sign

an award of $61,790.00 on the representation of Dennis Liggett,
Lochheads' public adjuster, that they wanted to deduct on their
income tax return the difference between the amount of their
claim and the amount of the arbitration award as a casualty
loss and wanted the award as proof of their loss in excess of
the insurance paid.

(Tr. at 27-28).
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Subsequently, Mr. Laursen learned that Lochheads had
submitted the $61,790.00 figure to American Concept for payment
on the personal contents loss.

(Tr. at 29).

Mr. Laursen told American Concept that this figure was not
correct and that while the award of $61,790.00 had been signed,
it was as an accommodation to Lochheads and that the proper
amount to be paid and the agreed upon appraisal figure was
actually $53,042.00.

(Tr. at 29-30).

Upon learning of this discrepancy, American Concept
exercised its statutory right to seek to either vacate the
$61,790.00 award and redo the appraisal or to modify it to the
$53,042.26 figure that Mr. Laursen believed to have been the
agreed upon figure.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's summary
judgment on the basis that they submitted an Affidavit of
Milton Q. Beck, which they claim raised an issue of fact
regarding their claim of a breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing.

Respondent submits that the appeal is without

merit for the following reasons.
First, the evidence from trial and the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law established that
American Concept was informed by its appraiser that the amount
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of the award that had been submitted to it for payment was
incorrect.

Acting upon this information, it instituted the

procedure provided by Utah statute to modify or vacate the
award.

In order to prevail on their claim of "bad faith"

defendants had to prove that plaintiff instituted the action to
modify or vacate the award without just cause or excuse.

The

facts as established at trial clearly establish that American
Concept had such justification.
Second, the Affidavit of Milton Beck fails to create any
issue of fact.

The Affidavit fails to set forth any fact to

support the conclusion that American Concept failed to satisfy
its duties of good faith and fair dealing.

Furthermore, it

speaks in the form of legal conclusions, which is not the
proper subject for expert opinion.

Moreover, Mr. Beck does not *

qualify as a legal expert.
Finally, appellants submit that they had independent tort
claims in addition to the claim for breach of the contractual
duty of good faith and fair dealing.

This allegation is

erroneous, however, as the additional claims for relief stated
by appellants were simply elements of damage associated with
the alleged breach and Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
supra., clearly establishes that the duty of good faith arises
in contract and not tort.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
AMERICAN CONCEPT DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTY OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY SEEKING VACATION OR
MODIFICATION OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD
Subsequent to the fire in October, 1983 and the filing of
this action, the Utah Supreme Court announced its decision in
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra.

In Beck, the Court

held that both the insured and the insurer have an implied and
parallel obligation to perform the insurance contract in good
faith.

It is the insurer's obligation, the Court stated, to

"diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine
whether a claim is valid", to "fairly evaluate the claim", and
to "thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or
settling the claim."
In order to prevail on their claim that American Concept
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by filing a
Petition to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, the Lochheads
have the burden to prove that plaintiff instituted the action
without just cause or excuse.

Where a bona fide issue exists

as to the amount of the award, plaintiff cannot, as a matter of
law, be found to have proceeded in derogation of its implied
duty of good faith.
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Utah law makes provision for the district courts, after
notice and hearing, to vacate an arbitration award.

Utah Code

Ann. § 78-31-16 mandates vacation of an award (1) where the
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
It is an undisputed fact that Donald Laursen, American
Concept's appraiser, believed that he had been duped into
signing an award with which he did not agree.

He conveyed this

fact to American Concept, which acted reasonably in seeking
either to vacate the award or modify it to the amount which Mr,
Laursen stated was the stipulated figure.

In following this

procedure, American Concept did no more than it was entitled by
Utah law.

Indeed, having been informed by Mr. Laursen that the

agreed-upon figure was actually some $9,000.00 less than the
signed award submitted, it had no reasonable alternative except
to bring the facts of the arbitration before an independent
fact-finding body.
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In Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d 353 (Utah 1932), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that a party may challenge an arbitration
award on the grounds of fraud, corruption, or misbehavior of
the arbitrators.

Even if the award appears valid upon its

face, the court may modify or vacate it.

Twin Lakes Reservoir

and Canal Company v. Piatt Rogers, Inc., 94 P.2d 1090 (Colo.
1939).

Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court in Mcintosh v.

Hartford Tire Insurance Company, 78 P.2d 82 (Mont. 1938) has
held that an appraiser's award may be set aside even where the
appraiser has no improper motive.

Thus, the Court may review

the method used by the appraiser in reaching his decision, even
when the award is proper on its face.
83.

Mcintosh, 78 P.2d at

An insurance company may deny payment to the insured when

a good faith controversy exists as to the amount owed.

Coe v.

Security National Insurance Company, 288 Kan. 624, 620 P.2d
1108, 1113 (1980) .
While the Utah Supreme Court does not speak directly to
this issue in Beck it is the uniform holding of courts from
other jurisdictions that if there is a good-faith controversy
as to the coverage or the amount thereof, the insurer who
contests coverage does not, as a matter of law, breach its duty
of good faith.
For example, in Pruitt v. Alaska Pacific Assurance Company,
626 P.2d 528 (Wash. App. 1981), the insured made a claim
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against his insurer to cover collision damage to a 1972 Ford
pickup truck.

The insurer's adjuster inspected the vehicle and

felt there was old damage to the truck, which he excluded.

The

insurer and the insured failed to agree on the adjustment of
the loss; the insured had the entire damage to the truck
repaired and brought legal action against the insurer.

The

trial court awarded the insured approximately $300.00 less than
the amount he had expended in repairs and he appealed.

On

appeal, the Court held that there was a bona fide dispute over
the existence and extent of old damage to the vehicle and,
under these circumstances, the insurer could not be found to
have violated its statutory duty to deal fairly with its
insured even though the adjuster had "doggedly held to his
original evaluation":
While it might have been preferable to seek the
opinion of a second adjuster in light of the dispute,
Alaska Pacific's total reliance on the single estimate
of its experienced adjuster . . . was reasonable and
did not constitute bad faith.
626 P.2d at 530.
Similarly, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v.
Cumiskey, 665 P.2d 223 (Mont. 1983), the insurance company
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it
was obligated to pay for fire damage to the insured premises
where the fire investigation revealed that the blaze had been
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intentionally set by the insured.

The insured counterclaimed,

alleging that the insurer had violated its statutory and common
law duties to settle the insurance claim in good faith.

The

trial court granted the insurer's motion for directed verdict
on the bad faith issue, holding that there were legitimate
questions as to who set the fire, how the fire was started and
who had the claim.

The insurer was, therefore, entitled to

test the coverage issue in the courts.

In upholding the trial

court, the Montana Supreme Court stated:
If otherwise appropriate an action for
declaratory judgment is not precluded by the existence
of another adequate remedy. . . .
In a proper case an
insurer may use this procedural device in order to
obtain a determination of the validity, continuance or
coverage of an insurance policy; a determination of
the extent of liability; or a determination of the
insurer's duties under the policy. We hold in this
case, St. Paul properly filed an action for
declaratory judgment . . . the district court properly
directed a verdict on the issue of bad faith.
665 P.2d 227-228.
This case is analogous.

The issue presented was whether

the appraisal award had been obtained by fraud, mistake or a
consideration of inappropriate items in the appraisal process.
The company reasonably relied on the statements made to it by
the appraiser that the award which he signed was not wrong.
The issue was presented to the Court pursuant to the statutory
procedure provided; the Court found that the appraisal award
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should be paid as signed, and the award was thereafter paid
with interest.
The fact that the District Court decided the vacation/
modification issue against American Concept does not change the
fact that a legitimate dispute existed at the time its Petition
was filed.

In order to establish a claim for bad faith, the

Lochheads must establish that there was no reasonable basis for
bringing the petition to modify the arbitration award.

Where a

genuine dispute exists defendants cannot, as a matter of law,
establish a claim for bad faith.

Carter v. Hartford Accident

and Indemnity Company, 423 F. Supp. 827 (U.D. Vir. 1976); Noble
v. National American Life Insurance Company, 624 P.2d 866
(Ariz. 1981); Armacost v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, 644 P.2d 403 (Kan. 1982); Santilli v. State
Farm Life Insurance Company, 562 P.2d 965 (Or. 1977).
In this case, the defendants recovered all policy benefits
from plaintiff to which they were entitled.

A legitimate issue

as to the amount of the arbitration award existed and
respondent instituted the appropriate procedure established by
Utah law to resolve the issue.

Under these circumstances,

plaintiff cannot be held to have breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing.
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POINT II
THE AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID NOT SET FORTH ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO RAISE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF
FACT
It is the appellants' contention that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment because the Affidavit of Milton
Beck established a material issue of disputed fact.
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit must do more
than reflect the affiant's opinion and conclusions.

Rather, it

must set forth specific facts, admissible under the rules of
evidence, which show that there is a genuine factual issue for
trial.

Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The mere

assertion that an issue of fact exists without proper
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is
insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment.
Webster v.

Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983).

Mr. Beck's affidavit fails to set forth specific
evidentiary facts indicating the basis for his opinion.

Mr.

Beck simply asserts that he has reviewed some documents and
believes that plaintiff failed in its good-faith duty.

In

Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court held that an affidavit which merely reflects the
affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and which fails to state
evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue of fact.
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In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment on the
basis that there exists a dispute as to a material issue of
fact, an affidavit must do more than recite legal opinions.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that opinion testimony on
questions of law, other than foreign law, is inadmissible.
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1982).
exactly what Mr. Beck's affidavit purports to do.

This is
Rather than

delineate any factual basis for the claim of the breach of the
duty of good faith, Mr. Beck simply concludes that "from the
materials examined it is his opinion as an expert in the field
that the documented conduct of the plaintiff insurer towards
defendants as its insured presents abundant evidence of the
insurer's failure to satisfy its legal duties of good faith and
fair dealing in the investigation and adjustment of defendants'
insured loss".

The trial court was clearly justified in ruling

that the Affidavit did not raise a question of material fact.
See generally, Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. United
Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165, 168 (1970).
Where there is no dispute as to the facts of the case, but
rather as to what legal effect those facts have, it is proper
for the trial court to grant summary judgment based upon its
own determination of the legal question involved.
Christiansen, 443 P.2d 402, 403 (Utah 1968).
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Larsen v.

This case clearly is different from the unopposed affidavit
submitted in opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra.

In Beck

the affiant stated that "he had been an insurance adjuster for
nineteen years and that he had reviewed the settlement
documentation submitted to Farmers in June when the claim was
first filed." The affiant expressed the opinion that a
reasonable and prudent insurance company would have valued the
claim at between $30,000.00 and $40,000.00 and attempted to
settle the matter within weeks after the initial offer".

The

Affidavit went on to state further that "the only reason for
such a substantial delay in settling this claim would be to put
Mr. Beck in a situation of financial need and stress so that he
would accept the first settlement offer." Beck, 701 P.2d at 797.
In contrast, the Affidavit of Mr. Beck submitted in this
case simply refers to some unidentified correspondence in an
unidentified "adjuster's file".

Mr. Beck states that he has

read this correspondence and speculates that it reveals a bad
intent on the part of American Concept.

Such testimony is

neither admissible nor competent and cannot be seen as raising
an issue of fact.

An analogous case is Pace v. Sagebrush Sales

Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 560 P.2d 789 (1977), in which the Arizona
Supreme Court held that a defendant's affidavit which did not
allege specific facts to support a counterclaim for fraud, but
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simply drew general conclusions to the effect that plaintiff's
misrepresentations were made intentionally and with knowledge
of their falsity, was insufficient.
The cases cited by appellants for the proposition that an
affidavit may defeat a motion for summary judgment are clearly
distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court held that plaintiff's Verified Complaint, which
controverted facts set forth in an affidavit submitted by
defendant in support of a motion for summary judgment, was
sufficient to create an issue of fact.

Where the Verified

Complaint was sufficient to meet the allegations of the
affidavit, it was unnecessary to submit an affidavit to
reiterate the sworn testimony of the Complaint.

This case

differs from the case at bar, however, since the Affidavit of
Mr. Beck does not offer any evidence to contradict the
testimony of Donald Laursen to the effect that he agreed to a
different figure and that he advised American Concept that it
should not pay the amount shown in the signed arbitration
award.

Indeed, Pentecost is supportive of respondent's

position - that is, that the trial testimony of Mr. Laursen,
which obviously was admissible, is sufficient to defeat the
conjectural and conclusory opinion set forth in Mr.
Affidavit.
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Beck's

Appellants also cite to Holbrook Company v.
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).

Adams, 542

The holding in Holbrook, however, simply

was that a single affidavit may create an issue of fact.

It

does not speak, however, to the question of whether an
affidavit sets forth admissible evidence sufficient to raise a
material issue of fact, which is the issue in this case.
Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to support
its Motion for Summary Judgment by proper proof or Affidavit.
Clearly, respondent's Motion was supported by the trial
testimony of Donald Laursen upon which it based its Motion, as
well as the Findings of Fact made by the trial court.

The

trial transcript of Donald Laursen was submitted in support of
the Motion for Summary Judgment and was available to the trial
court at the time it made its ruling.

Mr. Laursen's testimony

clearly sets forth sufficient facts to establish the reasonable
basis for plaintiff's filing of the Petition for Modification
or Vacation.

(Tr. pp. 27, 28, 30, 59 and 68). The testimony

clearly indicates that the appraiser felt that the final figure
of $61,790.00 was wrong and was not the figure that he had
agreed upon.

Indeed, Pentecost v. Harward, supra, cited by

appellants in their brief, supplies adequate precedent for the
fact that the form of the evidence submitted need not
necessarily be an "affidavit".

It need only be in the form of

sworn, admissible evidence that establishes specific facts.
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POINT III
APPELLANTS' COUNTERCLAIM FAILS TO STATE ANY CAUSE
OF ACTION IN ADDITION TO THE ALLEGED BREACH OF
THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Appellants' Counterclaim alleges that plaintiff "owed
defendants duties independent of the written contract of
insurance to deal fairly and in good faith in the
investigation, adjustment and payment of defendants' insured
losses".

(Counterclaim 1[9).

Clearly, this is wrong, since

Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra, establishes that the
duty of good faith and fair dealing is an implied covenant in
the insurance contract.

The remainder of the Counterclaim

simply contains allegations that plaintiff is entitled to
general and special damages, punitive damages and an award of
attorneys fees as a result of the alleged breach of the duty of
good faith.

Thus, there were no independent tort actions

alleged.
CONCLUSION
The evidence established at the trial on respondent's
Petition to Modify or Vacate the Aribitration Award clearly
established that respondent reasonably relied upon the
information received from its appraiser, Donald Larson, to the
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effect that the wrong amount had been submitted by Lochheads
for payment.

American Concept acted reasonably upon this

information and sought vacation or modification of the award.
The case was tried pursuant to statutory requirement and ruling
entered.

While respondent felt that the trial court applied

the wrong standard in reviewing the award - that is the court
held that the American Concept had the burden of proving that
the award was obtained through fraud - it did not appeal the
decision, but rather paid the $61,790.00 together with accrued
interest.
The Affidavit of Milton Beck does not purport to dispute
the facts established at trial.

Rather, the affiant speaks of

unidentified documents and facts and purports to testify that
in his legal opinion there was a breach of the duty of good
faith and good dealing.

The trial court properly held that Mr.

Beck's Affidavit was comprised of largely inadmissible evidence
and was insufficient to create a question of ultimate fact on
whether American Concept had a reasonable basis for instituting
the petition in the first instance.

The trial court's granting

of summary judgment on this issue is proper and should be
affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted this

O

day of May, 1987.

SNO*T\CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Dennis C. Ferguson
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of May, 1987 I
caused to be served upon all counsel of record four true and
correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief by first
class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Robert H. Wilde, Esq.
COOK & WILDE, P.C.
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490
Midvale, Utah 84047
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